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INSPECTION AND OVERSIGHT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CREATING AN OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIANE M. HARTMUS"
On December 5, 1995, Senator John McCain introduced legislation to
amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 and establish an Office of Inspec-
tor General (IG) in the Administrative Office (AO) of the United States
Courts.' The bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, but went no
further and did not become law.2 This article recommends that the AO sup-
port the creation of an Office of Inspector General in the federal courts.
This article begins with a discussion of the history of the Inspector Gen-
eral Act of 1978, its requirements, and looks at criticisms of the Act as well
as claims of success. Turning to the federal courts, this article reviews fed-
eral court administration, and examines in detail concerns about what effect
the creation of an IG would have on the separation of powers doctrine and
judicial independence. Concluding that an IG need not threaten either of
these concepts, the article discusses what the duties of an IG in the AO
would include. Further, this article discusses the need for reorganization,
noting that some of the statutorily prescribed duties of an IG are already per-
formed by the AO. In many cases, however, the creation of an IG's office
would require the development of new procedures and policies within the
AO, and the article discusses what these would contain. The article looks in
depth at the advantages to the AO of the creation of an office of IG. The arti-
cle concludes with suggestions of specific amendments to the proposed leg-
islation to address the appointment process for an IG in the AO, as well as
limit the scope of investigational authority of the IG.
Diane M. Hartmus is an Associate Professor of Court Administration in the Depart-
ment of Public Management at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New
York, and an Adjunct Professor at CUNY Law School. Prior to her current position, she
worked in the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and served as Law Clerk to
the Honorable Richard A. Enslen, United States District Court of the Western District of
Michigan. She received her J.D., cum laude, from Boston College Law School, and her B.A.,
with high distinction, from the University of Michigan.
I would like to thank Doris F. Tennant for comments on an earlier edition of this article
and for continuing support of my work.
1. S. 1446, 104th Cong. (1995).
2. See id.
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I. HISTORY OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
A. Early History
The Inspector General Act of 1978' created Offices of Inspector General
(IG) in twelve federal agencies, joining two IG offices that were already in
existence at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the De-
partment of Energy The Act codified an idea-and to some extent a prac-
tice-that had been around since the founding of the United States: The ob-
jective and independent inspection and oversight of an agency's activity.
The Continental Congress, in one of the first resolutions it passed, estab-
lished an IG, declaring it "essential to the promotion of discipline in the
American Army, and to the reformation of the various abuses which prevail
in the different departments." Abuses in Washington's army required IGs,
but over the next hundred years or so there was little perceived need for IGs
in the federal government, although the government did employ a handful of
auditors." In the 1920s, Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Ace
and decided to separate oversight of the expenditure of funds from the ac-
counting and auditing of accounts. Accordingly, the Bureau of the Budget
(now the Office of Management and Budget) was created in the Executive
Branch, and the General Accounting Office (GAO) was created as an arm of
the Congress
The GAO grew enormously, employing over 14,000 people at the
height of World War II.' Critics of the GAO questioned whether it could
practice both accounting and auditing, and members of Congress wondered
whether the crushing workload of the GAO was distracting it from the
broader aims of Congress." In 1950, Congress revised its earlier action and
returned the accounting and internal audit function to the executive branch."
Today, the GAO is described as "an instrumentality of the United States
Government independent of the executive departments."' 2 All agencies are
required to perform administrative audits of their accounts before submitting
3. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3 (1994).
4. See Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie Fine Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the
Federal Government: A New Approach to Accountability, 36 ALA. L. REV. 473,474 (1985).
5. PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 25 (1993) (quoting Fredrick C. Mosher, Comment by Fredrick C. Mo-
sher, in IMPROVING THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT 72 (Bruce
L.R. Smith & James D. Carroll eds., 1982)).
6. See id.
7. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18,42 Stat. 20 (repealed).
8. See LIGHT, supra note 5, at 27.
9. See id. (quoting NORMAN J. ORENSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 1991-
1992 (1992)).
10. See id. at 27-28.
11. Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1950, ch. 946, 64 Stat. 832 (repealed).
12. 31 U.S.C. § 702(a) (1994).
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them to the Comptroller General, who is the head of the General Accounting
Office. 3 In agencies with Inspectors General, the audits are to be performed
by the IG.'4
B. First Modem Office of Inspector General
The Department of Agriculture is generally credited with creating the
first modem IG office." Created after a scandal, in which Mr. Billie Sol
Estes defrauded the Department out of enormous amounts of money, 6 the
Department of Agriculture IG was to perform audit and investigative serv-
ices of the department and all its contractual parties. 7 The IG served at the
pleasure of, and reported only to, the Secretary of the Department. The in-
cumbent in this office stressed that the office was not "interested in perse-
cuting people or conducting inquisitions ... we are in business to assist op-
erating personnel ... to protect individuals at all levels from false or
incorrect accusations or incriminations in the discharge of their jobs."'8 The
creators of the 1978 Act sought to maintain this same sentiment in the IG of-
fices created by their legislation.
The Agricultural IG position was not statutorily protected, leaving it
vulnerable to the whims of politicians. 9 Although the IG received positive
reviews from the General Accounting Office,20 the Secretary of Agriculture
and Nixon appointee, Earl Butz, eliminated the position in 1974, reestab-
lishing two separate offices of audit and investigation.' In 1977, the Secre-
tary of Agriculture appointed by President Carter reestablished the position
immediately upon taking office.2
13. See id. § 3521(a).
14. See id. § 3521(e)(1). The IG may also choose to have the audit conducted by an in-
dependent external auditor. See id.
15. The Department of Agriculture is generally credited as first, but in 1959 Congress
created a position called the "Inspector General and Comptroller" to be appointed by the Sec-
retary of State. See LIGHT, supra note 5, at 28. In 1961, Congress made this position a presi-
dential appointee, changed the name to "Inspector General, Foreign Assistance," and at-
tempted to strengthen the position, giving the position a permanent budget and the authority
to suspend any project being investigated. See id. at 29. However, exactly what this office did
remains unclear. See id. It was considered a failure and abolished in the 1970s. See id. at 30-
31. It is not generally credited in the history of modem IG offices. See id. at 31.
16. See Billie Sol Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 532 (1965).
17. See LIGHT, supra note 5, at 32.
18. Id. at 33 (quoting WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN:
GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES 121 (1966)).
19. See LIGHT, supra note 5, at 31-32.
20. See Gates & Knowles, supra note 4, at 477 (citing COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, REVIEw OF ACTIVITIES OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968)).
21. See Gates & Knowles, supra note 4, at 480.
22. See LIGHT, supra note 5, at 33, 35.
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C. Public and Congressional Concern
Public concern about waste, fraud, and abuse in government reached a
crescendo in the mid-seventies,23 and public agencies were ineffective in
identifying and eliminating such abuse."' In addition, there was a lack of uni-
formity and leadership among government agencies in responding. Many
problems arose because investigators often reported to a variety of officials
within their agencies, and were in some cases required to report to the offi-
cials responsible for the program under investigation.'
Congress recognized the need for increased inspection and oversight ca-
pabilities in governmental agencies. In response to reports of cheating in the
Medicare and Guaranteed Student Loan programs, an IG office was created
in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1976.26 This IG was
to be appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, and was to report
directly to Congress2 In early 1977, a bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives seeking to create offices of IGs in eleven government agen-
cies that would basically be identical to the office created in HEW a year be-
fore.2
8
The bill sought to combine three contemporary strategies of account-
ability in the fight against waste, fraud, and abuse: compliance with rules,
performance incentives, and improvements in governmental capacity.29 In its
report to the Senate on the bill, the Committee on Governmental Affairs ac-
knowledged that the federal government had failed to make effective efforts
to control waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.3" It attributed the failure
23. This was, of course, in part due to the Watergate scandal. Although Watergate was
primarily a matter of ethics, in the minds of the public it served to create more suspicion about
government in general, including suspicions about waste, fraud and abuse. See Gates &
Knowles, supra note 4, at 503-04; see also Frederick C. Mosher et al., Watergate: linplica-
tions for Responsible Government, in CLASSICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 357 (Jay M.
Shafritz & Albert C. Hyde eds., 4th ed. 1997).
24. See James S. Richards & William S. Fields, The Inspector General Act: Are Its In-
vestigative Provisions Adequate to Meet Current Needs?, 12 GEo. MASON L. REv. 227, 229
(1990). In some instances employees were not required to report evidence of irregularities and
many agencies had no programs for identifying fraud, waste, and abuse. See id. In some agen-
cies, investigations were not allowed without the approval of the officials responsible for the
programs under investigation. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 584, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7
(1978)).
25. See id.
26. See Gates & Knowles, supra note 4, at 480. Interestingly, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare opposed the bill, claiming that it would "seriously hamper the Secre-
tary's ability to manage the Department" and "would deprive the Secretary of the control nec-
essary to guarantee 'the integrity of the Department's program funds."' Id. at 485; See also
H.R. 11347, 94th Cong. (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1324 (1976).
27. See Gates & Knowles, supra note 4, at 481.
28. See H.R. 2819, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 3172 (1977); Gates &
Knowles, supra note 4, at 489.
29. See LIGHT, supra note 5, at 11.
30. See Gates & Knowles, supra note 4, at 499.
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to ".... deficiencies in the way executive establishments ha[d] approached
their audit and investigative responsibilities."'" In particular, the report noted
the need to make the audit and investigative functions accountable only to
the Secretary, or head, of the agency, noting the inherent conflict when the
investigator and auditor are under the control of the director of the program
being investigated.32
The agencies affected by the bill uniformly testified in opposition. They
strongly opposed the requirement that the IG be a presidential appointee, ar-
guing that this politicized investigative activity, placing the audit and inves-
tigative functions above the agency's administration.33 Additionally, the Of-
fice of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice (DOJ) stated that several
provisions of the bill violated the doctrine of separation of powers.3" Specifi-
cally, DOJ objected to the requirement that the IG report directly to Con-
gress. DOJ noted that it "ha[d] repeatedly taken the position that continuous
oversight of the functioning of Executive agencies ... is not a proper legis-
lative function,"35 although it admitted that "numerous statutes with this de-
fect were currently in force."'36 DOJ further objected that the doctrine of
separation of powers would be violated by making the IG "subject to divided
and possibly inconsistent obligations to the Executive and Legislative
Branch... ."' DOJ also expressed concern that the IG's "unrestricted ac-
cess ... to Executive branch information, coupled with the unqualified obli-
gation to provide that material to Congress, compromises the recognized
privilege of the executive office in investigations.""
Negotiations between the White House and Congress led to a compro-
mise in the legislation: The IG's report was to be transmitted to Congress
through the head of the agency, who could respond to the report but not
change it.39 DOJ did not pursue its objections based on the separation of
powers doctrine,' and in 1978 the bill was signed into law by President
31. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1071, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978)).
32. See id. at 499.
33. See Gates & Knowles, supra note 4, at 491-92.
34. See id. at 501.
35. Id. (citing memorandum from Attorney General Griffen Bell to President Jimmy
Carter (Feb. 24, 1977) (enclosing memorandum from John M. Harmon, Acting Assistant At-
torney General. Office of Legal Counsel to Griffin Bell, Attorney General (Feb. 21, 1977))
(copy available in The University of Alabama School of Law Library)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 501-02.
39. At the request of the White House, the bill was pulled from the floor by the Speaker
of the House before a vote could be taken. See id. at 502. Initially the compromise included a
promise to eliminate the requirement that the President report to Congress his reasons for re-
moving an IG. See id. However, this provision reappeared in the final copy of the bill, which
President Carter signed into law on Oct. 12, 1978. See id. at 503.
40. The courts have not specifically been asked to address the separation of powers is-
sues raised by DOJ. However, the authority of IGs has been implicitly recognized in cases
affirming the right of IGs to conduct audits as well as civil and criminal investigations. See,
247
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Carter.'
II. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
A. Duties of Inspectors General
The Inspector General Act of 1978 charges IGs with five main duties.
First, they are to conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to
the programs and operations of their agency.' Second, they are to review
existing and proposed legislation relating to their agencies, and to make rec-
ommendations regarding the impact of such legislation on the economy and
efficiency of the agency. 3 Third, they are to recommend policies to promote
economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and to provide leadership and coor-
dination with other federal, state and local agencies.' Fourth, they are to
prevent and detect fraud and abuse in the programs and operations of their
agencies. 5 Fifth, they are to provide a means for keeping the head of the
agency and the Congress informed about problems and deficiencies in the
administration of their agencies' programs and operations, as well as the ne-
cessity for, and the progress of, corrective action. 6
B. Appointment Process
The Act specifies that Inspectors General are to be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, "without regard to po-
litical affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability
in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or investigations."4 The IG reports directly to the agency
head or the second in command, and is not to report to, or be supervised by,
anyone else in the agency. 8 The Act specifies that no one in the agency shall
prevent the IG from carrying out, or completing, an audit or investigation.
e.g., Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986) (requiring recipient of government funds to
repay amount used unlawfully as discovered in an audit conducted by the IG for the Dept. of
Labor); Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648 (1985) (upholding disciplinary action taken address-
ing employee misconduct that was confirmed by an investigation conducted by the IG of the
General Services Administration); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 788 F.2d 164
(3rd Cir. 1986) (recognizing right of IG to conduct criminal investigations and issue subpoe-
nas).
41. See Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ I-
11(1978)).
42. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4(a)(1) (1994).
43. See id. § 4(a)(2).
44. See id. § 4(a)(3), (4).
45. See id. § 4(a)(4).
46. See id. § 4(a)(5).
47. Id. § 3(a).
48. See id.
49. See id.
[Vol. 35
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Inspectors General so appointed may only be removed from office by
the President, who must communicate the reasons for any such removal to
both Houses of Congress." In 1988, the Act was amended to provide for the
creation of IGs in several executive "entities," such as the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and
the Federal Election Commission.5 These IGs are appointed by the head of
that agency in which they serve and are supervised only by the head of the
agency. 2 If the IG is removed from office or transferred, the agency head
must set forth in writing the reasons for the action to both Houses of Con-
gress.
53
C. Further Requirements of the Act
The Act requires each IG to appoint an Assistant Inspector General for
Auditing and an Assistant Inspector General for Investigations." Combining
the auditing and investigation responsibilities in the Office of the IG is one
of the organizational changes mandated by the Act.5 Another change is the
requirement that the IG report directly to Congress, in semiannual reports,
every significant problem, abuse, and deficiency identified during the previ-
ous six months.5 Also, within seven days of becoming aware of "particularly
serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies," an IG must file a re-
port with the agency head, who then files a report with Congress.' Although
the Act provides that the IG file these reports with the agency head, the re-
ports are to be passed on to Congress unchanged. 8 The head of the agency
may, however, send comments regarding the report directly to Congress. 9
Nevertheless, this ability to speak directly to Congress protects the inde-
pendence of the IG and is a source of significant power.
The IG Act reorganizes the way information is reported in agencies as a
strategy to improve the auditing and investigative functions of the agencies.'
By locating an Assistant IG in charge of Audits and an Assistant IG in
charge of Investigations in one office, the Act seeks to further interaction
50. See id. § 3(b).
51. See Pub. L. 100-504, Title I, § 104(a), 102 Stat. 2522 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §
8G (1988)).
52. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8G(c), (d) (1994).
53. See id. § 8G(e).
54. See id. § 3(d)(1), (2).
55. The Act requires that auditing and investigation functions be under one manager, the
IG, instead of being located in different part of an agency as was a more traditional structure.
See Gates & Knowles, supra note 4, at 505.
56. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a)(1) (1994).
57. Id.
58. See Gates & Knowles, supra note 4, at 502.
59. Both the IG's report and the agency head's report must be made available to the pub-
lic 60 days after filing. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(c) (1994).
60. See Gates & Knowles, supra note 4, at 504.
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between the two units, presumably strengthening the effectiveness of each
unit." At the same time, the Act recognizes the uniqueness of each function
by requiring that they remain in separate units.6" Beyond this guidance on
organization the Act is silent, leaving it to each IG to decide how best to or-
ganize her office.63
D. Criticisms of Current Offices of Inspectors General
A Vision Statement and Statement of Reinvention Principles adopted by
the federal IGs in 1994 stresses that IGs "are not adversaries of program
managers" and that they share the "common goal of improving Government
programs."' This is most likely a response to criticisms that IGs have fo-
cused on the "finding [of] waste, fraud and abuse" portion of their mission,
to the exclusion of the "promoting efficient effective service" portion.' A
standard of evaluation that rates IGs on the number of "mistakes" they find
has contributed to this problem and too often resulted in the development of
adversarial relationships with agency managers." In his information gather-
ing for the National Performance Review (NPR),67 Vice President Al Gore
noted that "federal employees complain[ed] that the IGs' basic approach in-
hibits innovation and risk taking.... [T]he IG' [s] watchfulness [is] compel-
ling employees to follow every rule, document every decision, and fill out
every form... ,"" often stanching any efforts to do things better, which may
involve breaking the rules.69 As a result, the NPR recommended that the fo-
cus of IGs be broadened to improve systems, preventing waste, fraud, and
abuse rather than merely identifying them. The NPR noted that this was part
of the IGs' original mandate, and that no new legislation need be passed to
make this happen." The report encouraged IGs to collaborate with agency
managers and suggested that criteria be established for judging IG perform-
61. See id. at 505.
62. See id.
63. A brief example of one IG's organizational chart may be found at the home page of
the Office of the Inspector General of the Peace Corps (visited Feb. 1999)
<http:llwww.peacecorps.gov/aboutloig.html>. A list of IG home pages may be found at
<http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/-pub-mgtintranet.html> (visited Feb. 1999).
64. IG Vision Statement and Statement of Reinvention Principles (visited Mar. 9, 1999)
<http:llwww.ignet.gov/ignetlinternallmanuallvision.html>.
65. See AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE To RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT
WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS 31-32 (1993).
66. See id. at 32.
67. The NPR is President Clinton's initiative to "reinvent" government. Begun on March
3, 1993, when President Clinton asked Vice President Gore to lead an effort to "review" the
workings of the federal government, the initiative has resulted in thousands of recommenda-
tions and produced numerous reports. See generally GORE, supra note 65.
68. GORE, supra note 65, at 32.
69. See id.
70. See id.
[Vol. 35
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ance, beyond counting the number of "mistakes" found.7
There are also concerns with the limited law enforcement authority
granted to IGs under the Act.72 While the Act grants IGs the authority to
conduct criminal investigations, it does not authorize them to carry firearms,
make arrests, or serve warrants."3 These are authorities routinely granted to
criminal investigators in the executive branch." This lack of authority puts at
risk those IGs who may be called upon to enter high-crime areas, identify
themselves as federal agents, and attempt to gather information.75 As a result,
over half of all the criminal investigators employed in offices of IGs have
sought some type of law enforcement authority derived from sources outside
the Act.76 This has led to confusion, administrative red tape, and increased
costs.77 This problem could be addressed by a statute that grants IGs the
authority to carry firearms, make arrests, and serve process, including search
warrants, under guidelines established by the Attorney General!'
E. Successes
Despite these concerns, the IG concept has proven to be quite success-
ful. By 1989 there were twenty-seven presidentially appointed IGs, and
thirty-four nonpresidentially appointed IGs.79 Today, there are over 15,000
71. See id.
72. See Richards & Fields, supra note 24, at 232-33.
73. See id. at 233.
74. In fact, IGs are trained at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center with investi-
gators from other federal law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tions, the United States Secret Service, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. See id. at 233.
75. See id. at 234.
76. For instance, criminal investigators may seek to obtain "special deputations" from
the Department of Justice, which involves a multi-step approval process taking three to four
months to complete. See id. at 238. IGs may also seek a delegation of authority from their
agency heads pursuant to section 9(a)(2) of the Act, which provides that the agency head may
transfer to the IG ".... other... functions, powers or duties .... properly related to the func-
tions of the Office." See 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 9(a)(2) (1994). This approach, which has no
foundation in case law, jeopardizes investigations and raises issues of liability. See Richards
& Fields, supra note 24, at 239-40.
77. See Richards & Fields, supra note 24, at 237.
78. See id. at 240.
79. In 1989, presidentially-appointed IGs existed in the Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, Transportation, Education,
State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, the Community Services Administration, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the General Services Administration, the National Aeronautics Admini-
stration, the Veterans Administration, the United States Synfuels Corporation, the Agency for
International Development, the Railroad Retirement Board, the United States Information
Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Federal Emergency Management
Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Office of Personnel Management,
the Resolution Trust Company, and the Central Intelligence Agency. See LIGHT, supra note 5,
at 26. Nonpresidentially appointed IGs existed at Action, Amtrak, the Appalachian Regional
Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Board for Interna-
tional Broadcasting, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Equal Employment Oppor-
9
Hartmus: Inspection and Oversight in the Federal Courts: Creating an Offic
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
employees in the offices of federal IGsO' Although measurements of total
money saved or money put to better use by IGs vary widely, it is safe to say
that IG audits and investigations have revealed instances of waste, fraud, and
abuse in federal agencies that collectively now total in the billions of dol-
lars.8' In a recent report to Congress, the Office of the IG for the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) reported that in the twenty years since
its inception, its work has resulted in savings of more than $80 billion to the
federal government. For fiscal year 1996, it reported savings of $4.7 billion,
"comprised of $4,184.9 billion in implemented recommendations to put
funds to better use, $274.6 million in disallowances from questioned costs,
and $237.4 million from investigative receivables."82 As a further example of
recent success, on March 27, 1997, the HHS IG reported uncovering a Medi-
care fraud scheme perpetrated by a mental health care executive in the
amount of $2.5 million.83
tunity Commission, the Farm Credit Administration, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Election Commission, the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board, the Federal Labor Relations Authority, the Federal Maritime
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Government Printing Office, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Legal Service Corporation, the National Archives and Records
Administration, the National Credit Union Administration, the National Endowment for the
Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the National Labor Relations Board, the
National Science Foundation, the Panama Canal Commission, the Peace Corps, the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Smithsonian
Institution, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the United States International Trade Commis-
sion, and the United States Postal Service. See id.
80. See GORE, supra note 65, at 31.
81. See Richards & Fields, supra note 24, at 227- 28.
82. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
SEMIANNUAL REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING SEPT. 30, 1996 (visited Mar. 6, 1999)
<http:/www.dhhs.gov/progorg/oig/semann/index.htmi>.
83. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
MEDIA ADVISORY, Mental Health Care Executive Pled Guilty in Medicare Fraud Scheme
(Mar. 27, 1997) (visited Mar. 6, 1999) <http:l/www.dhhs.gov/progorglioglmedadv/mandersnl
html>.
[Vol. 35
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III. INSPECTORS GENERAL IN THE COURTS'
A. Federal Court Administration
Administration of the federal courts is unique. Unlike any executive
agency, the administrative structure of the federal courts is highly decen-
tralized. The federal court system is comprised of independent judges who
are governed largely by agreement and consensus with very little hierarchi-
cal structure.85 Each of the ninety-four district courts and thirteen circuit
courts of appeals is allowed considerable latitude in implementing national
policy guidance.86 Decisions regarding most administrative functions in the
courts are the responsibility of the local courts. This has been particularly
true in the areas of budget, information resource management, and person-
nel.87 Under the guidance of the chief judge (who is the senior incumbent and
serves a maximum of seven years),8 court executives, clerks of court, and
their staffs perform day-to-day administrative functions such as management
of cases, finances, space and facilities, and personnel systems.
The principal policymaking body of the federal judiciary-the Judicial
84. This paper discusses the creation of an OIG in the federal court system. However, an
informal search for court systems having Inspectors General, conducted with the assistance of
the National Center for State Courts, turned up only two examples: the Unified Court System
of the State of New York and the court system for the State of Florida. Created by an order of
the Chief Judge of the State of New York in 1982, the Inspector General of the Unified Court
System has oversight over the court system's 12,700 nonjudicial employees. The New York
IG handles cases involving complaints against court employees, conducts all background in-
vestigations of prospective employees, and investigates or studies the "affairs, functions, ac-
counts, methods, personnel or efficiency" of any court in the system. See order creating the
position of Inspector General of the Unified Court System in the State of New York, Sec. 2.
(A undated, unsigned, copy of the order creating the New York position, received from the
Inspector General's office, is on file with the author.) The order creating the position does not
specify any appointment process, and the current IG, who was selected by the Chief Judge
and the Chief Administrative Judge of the State of New York, has held the position since its
creation. See Martin Fox, Courts' Inspector General-Tough, But Fair, in His Work, NEV
YORK L.J., Mar. 16, 1989, at 1. Notably, the New York IG does not have jurisdiction over
complaints against judges and cannot investigate judges. Telephone interview with William
Gallagher, Inspector General of the Unified Court System of the State of New York (Feb. 24,
1997). Any complaints about judges he receives are referred to the State Commission on Ju-
dicial Conduct. See id. In fact, a proposal to create an office of Judicial Inspector General,
with the power to investigate complaints against judges and file formal charges was defeated
in the New York State Senate in 1991. See Gary Spencer, Judicial Conduct Commission Re-
form Bill Gains Momentum, NEw YORK L.J., May 23, 1991, at 1. The Florida IG is charged
with "providing a central point for coordination and responsibility for activities that promote
accountability, integrity, and efficiency in government." FLA. STAT. ch. 20.055 (2) (1997).
The IG is appointed by the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court and may be removed
from office only by the Chief Justice. See FLA. STAT. ch. 20.055 (3)(a), (c) (1997).
85. See William Lucianovic, Strategic Planning in the Judicial Branch, 25 THE PUBLIC
MANAGER 23 (Fall 1996).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 24.
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 136 (3)(a) (1994).
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Conference of the United States--oversees an extensive network of com-
mittees and is composed of twenty-seven judges and the Chief Justice of the
United States. In 1938, Congress created the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (AO) to provide a wide range of administrative, legal,
and program support services to the federal courts. 9 The director of the AO
is charged with carrying out the decisions of the Judicial ConferenceP° and
directing an agency with approximately 900 employees and a budget of $44
million, which in turn provides administrative support to a judiciary with a
budget of $2.7 billion and over 27,000 employees."
B. Relationship Between the Judicial and Legislative Branches
The creation of an office of an IG in the AO revisits the delicate issue of
the relationship between the legislative and judicial branches. The exact lo-
cation of the line between judicial independence and congressional oversight
of the judiciary has never been firmly established. Tension between the
branches over the administrative operations of the judiciary is ongoing.' The
creation of an IG who reports directly to Congress raises questions involving
the separation of powers doctrine and the effect such an office might have on
judicial independence.
1. Separation of Powers
Critics of the creation of an office of IG in the federal courts will argue
that it violates the "separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reci-
procity" that the Supreme Court has identified as being the essence of the
separation of powers doctrine.93 Neither history nor the Constitution supports
this assertion. There are no well-accepted arguments supporting the proposi-
tion that the judiciary has, or should have, as a branch, the level of inde-
pendence in its administration that individual judges have in their judicial
decisionmaking"
In 1939, Congress removed the Department of Justice's administrative
authority over the federal courts and created the AO, effectively removing
89. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-114 THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: REvIEWS OF COURT OPERATIONS SHOULD ADHERE TO OVERSIGHT
STANDARDS: REPORT TO THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF
GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 1-2 (1996) [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON COURT OVERSIGHT
STANDARDS].
90, See 28 U.S.C. § 604 (1994).
91. See 141 CONG. REC. S18016-03 (Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Senator McCain).
92. See infra Part V.A.
93. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996).
94. See Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges and the Judicial
Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REV. 835, 845 (1995).
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the executive branch from the day-to-day affairs of the judiciary." In so do-
ing, Congress placed the responsibility for the day-to-day administrative
authority over the courts in the hands of the courts themselves. However, in
the creation of the AO, Congress did not renounce its responsibility for the
authorization, appropriation, and oversight of the federal courts."' The Con-
stitution grants Article III judges the protections of tenure during good be-
havior and a salary that cannot be diminished.' However, as Chief Justice
Rehnquist recently noted, the "federal courts are heavily dependent upon
Congress for virtually every other aspect of their being." 8 Congress' respon-
sibilities include authorizing every judgeship in the federal system," estab-
lishing the level of judicial compensation,'" determining the jurisdiction of
the federal court,'"' establishing the substantive law and procedure applied in
federal courts,'" and appropriating the funds for the judiciary's budget." In
creating the AO, Congress retained the ability to make changes in the way
the AO operates. In fact, in 1990, Congress changed the process for ap-
pointing the Director of the AO, transferring the responsibility from the Su-
preme Court to the Chief Justice in consultation with the Judicial Conference
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
98. William H. Rehnquist, 1994 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, reprinted in
18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 499,499 (1995).
99. Congress last created new federal judgeships in 1990. See Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). The Judicial Conference has submitted to
the 105th Congress a request to create new judgeships at the appellate, district and bankruptcy
levels. The request was denied. See Judicial Conference Meets, Seeks New Judgeships for
Growing Workload, THE THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 1997 (visited Mar. 3, 1999)
<http:llwww.uscourts.gov/ttb/apr97ttb/396jc.htm>; see also THE THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1998(visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http:llwww.uscourts.gov/ttb/dec98ttb/decemberl998.html>.
100. Legislation seeking a pay increase for federal judges was submitted in both the
House and the Senate of the 105th Congress. See H.R. 875, 105th Cong. (1997); see also S.
394, 105th Cong. (1997). In addition, the legislation sought to repeal section 140 of P.L. 97-
92, which requires that Congress affirmatively vote for cost-of-living increases for federal
judges. The legislation was defeated. See Committee Addresses Crisis in Federal Pay, THE
THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1999 (visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http:llwww.uscourts.gov/ttb/feb99ttb/ feb-
mary 1999.html>.
101. Federal question jurisdiction was not conferred upon the federal courts by Congress
until 1875. See L. Ralph Mecham, Introduction to Mercer Law Review Symposium on Federal
Judicial Independence, 46 MERCER L. REV. 637, 640 (1995).
102. Congress has the authority to regulate the Rules of Procedure used in federal courts.
In the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Congress delegated a portion of that authority to the judi-
ciary, reserving for itself the right to reject, enact, amend, or defer any rules. See Rehnquist,
supra note 98, at 499, 500; Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44
AM. U. L. REv.1655, 1658 (1995).
103. During the budget crisis of 1996, the Chief Justice requested that Congress pass a
separate appropriation funding the judiciary in full while negotiations continued on the rest of
the budget. See Patrick E. Longan, Faces of Washington: The Budget Crises and The Courts,
43 FED. LAW. 27 (May 1996). On January 6, 1996, the President signed P.L. 104-91 funding
the judiciary at an increase of 5.1% over the budget for fiscal year 1995. See Judiciary Se-
cures FY 96 Funding, THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1996, at 1, 10.
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of the United States.'" Provided that the suggestions regarding appointment,
discussed below, are implemented, the creation of an IG in the AO does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine between the legislature and the ju-
diciary and is an appropriate exercise of legislative oversight."
2. Judicial Independence
The separation of powers doctrine is only one of the requirements for an
unbiased judiciary. Equally important is the requirement of judicial inde-
pendence.'" Some may argue that the mere presence of an IG, with unfet-
tered investigatory powers, would be chilling to judicial independence. The
judiciary in this country is founded upon the belief that judges must remain
free from outside pressure, political or otherwise, in rendering decisions in
the cases before them. 7 The presence of an IG, ready to investigate a
judge's every move, could pose a threat to judicial independence.
The solution lies in not granting IGs the power to investigate a judge's-
"every move." Specifically, a judge's judicial decisionmaking should not be
exposed to the threat of investigation, by an IG or anyone else. Legislation
creating the office of IG must clearly assert that the IG is not to investigate
the process or substance of judicial decisionmaking. 8 Complaints of judicial-
misconduct should continue to be handled according to the dictates of 28
U.S.C. section 372.'" Of course, investigations into waste, fraud, and abuse
in the courts may indirectly affect the working environment of judges. How-
ever, protection from direct investigation provides the element of assurance
needed to protect judicial independence.
IV. DUTIES OF AN INSPECTOR GENERAL IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
In many cases, the creation of an office of IG would require reorganiza-
104. Pub. L. 101-650, Title III, § 307, 104 Stat. 5112 (1990) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 601 (1994)).
105. Assuming that the IG is appointed by the Chief Justice, see discussion infra Part
VI.B.I.
106. Bermant and Wheeler distinguish between "decisional independence" the ability of
a judge to make a legal decision unfettered by the threat of coercion, and "administrative" or
"branch" independence, the ability of the judiciary to administer itself according to systems it
establishes. See Bermant & Wheeler, supra note 94, at 838. It is generally believed that while
Constitutional protections exist to protect "decisional independence," they do not exist for
"administrative" independence. See id.
107. See Bermant & Wheeler, supra note 94, at 839.
108. Although the bill does not clearly state this, in his statement introducing his legisla-
tion to Congress, Senator McCain stressed that he wanted "to make clear that the inspector
general at the AO would have no authority to review and report on matters involving the Fed-
eral courts' judicial decisions. Jurisdiction would be limited strictly to the administrative
functions performed by the AO." 141 CONG. REc. S 18016-03 (Dec. 5, 1995).
109. See infra Part VI.B.2.
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tion of AO departments to bring existing functions under the control of the
IG. The AO already performs, with varying levels of success, certain duties
prescribed by the 1978 Act. The creation of an IG would strengthen these
functions by requiring that they be performed in accordance with generally
accepted government standards.
A. Auditing and Program Reviews
Among its duties, the AO conducts financial audits and "program re-
views.'.. The manner in which this is done has changed significantly after
the responsibility for court audits and disbursement of judicial funds was
transferred to the AO from the Department of Justice in 1975."' From 1975
to 1985, the AO had an audit department that performed routine cyclical fi-
nancial audits and management reviews of the courts at the same time."' In
1985, the Director of the AO began to receive comments from judges that
the AO's "management review process should be more sensitive to matters
that were exclusively the concern of the courts.""' 3 In the same year, the AO
separated the financial audit function from the program review function,
placing them on different review cycles."'
In 1988, the AO reorganized, discontinuing the Office of Audit and Re-
view and creating an Office of Audit to conduct only court financial re-
views."5 The work of program reviews was delegated to individual program
units within the AO, and an Office of Program Assessment (OPA) was cre-
ated to oversee and coordinate the individual program units' efforts at re-
view and to carry out "special reviews and investigations.""' 6
In 1996, Senator Carl Levin requested that the General Accounting Of-
fice (GAO) review the internal oversight of administrative operations within
the federal judiciary, including examining how the AO assessed the effi-
ciency of local court operations and promoted the use of efficient adminis-
trative practices within the judiciary."7 The report found that, although the
AO was following generally accepted government auditing standards in its
financial audits, its OPA lacked structure and clear standards for conducting
nonfinancial reviews."' Specifically, the report found that program reviews
did not usually result in written reports, the results of the reviews were not
generally distributed to all affected parties, and in those areas where reports
were prepared and recommendations were made, follow-up on recommen-
110. GAO REPORT ON COURT OVERSIGHT STANDARDS, supra note 89, at 3.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 2.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 4.
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dations was inconsistent."9 Some of the statistics were grim. Of the 376 re-
views the GAO examined, "244 of the reviews ... either did not result in
written reports, were erroneous entries, had reports that the AO could not lo-
cate, were duplicate entries in OPA's data, were never completed, or had re-
ports that were still in draft form." '
The GAO reported that in November of 1995 (only weeks before the
introduction of Senator McCain's bill), the OPA had issued written stan-
dards for conducting program assessments.' With two significant excep-
tions, the GAO confirmed that these standards tracked generally accepted
government auditing standards.' The exceptions were that the new stan-
dards did not require that program assessors be independent of the unit they
were assessing, or that assessment reports be distributed to all officials who
could act on the findings and recommendations, and thus the GAO recom-
mended that the standards be amended." In a written response to the GAO
report, the AO stated that it agreed with the report's recommendations and
intended to adopt them without reservation. 4 Because IGs are legislatively
mandated to comply with standards established by the Comptroller General
for the auditing of federal agencies,"z the creation of an IG in the AO would
assure that the recommendations were carried out and maintained in the fu-
ture.
B. Review of Existing and Proposed Legislation
In 1976, the AO created an Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) to per-
form liaison activities with Congress, other governmental entities, and pri-
vate sector organizations.2 6 Among its stated functions are the preparation of
responses to legislative or policy inquiries from Congress, the monitoring of
congressional activity that will have a major impact upon the judiciary, and
the establishment and promotion of ".... better lines of communication be-
tween the federal judiciary, the Congress, the executive branch, state gov-
ernments [and] bar associations.... " 7
The OLA also is tasked with preparing Judicial Impact Statements ana-
lyzing the effects of legislative and executive branch proposals, and legisla-
tion on the resources and operations of the federal judiciary.'28 OLA esti-
119. See id.
120. See id. at 6.
121. See id. at7.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 15.
124. See id. at 22.
125. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4(b)(1)(A).
126. Telephone interview with Arthur White, Deputy Director of the Office of Legisla-
tive Affairs (June 30, 1997).
127. Memorandum describing the mission and functions of the OLA, provided by the
OLA of the AO (on file with the author).
128. See id. The ability of the AO to correctly predict the impact of proposed legislation
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mates that it tracked approximately 1500 bills during the 104th Congress,
and is currently tracking 849 bills in the 105th Congress.29 These include not
only bills that refer directly to the federal courts, but any bill that would af-
fect the federal courts in any way, including new criminal or civil statutes
that would increase the courts' workload.
Although no formal records are kept, official exchanges between Con-
gress and the judiciary have increased over the last ten years. 30 Clearly, the
AO recognizes the need for continued liaison and outreach with Congress.
Because the Inspector General Act of 1978 imposes on the IG the duty of re-
viewing proposed legislation' and maintaining coordination with other fed-
eral agencies,' the work currently being done by the OLA in the AO need
not change, but only be relocated.
C. The Promotion of Efficiency and Effectiveness
In its report to Senator Levin on oversight standards, the GAO also
noted efforts the courts are making to promote more efficient practices.'
The report mentioned the establishment of an Economy Subcommittee
within the Judicial Conference's Budget Committee, which is charged with
reviewing the judiciary's budget submission and initiating and pursuing
studies about "ways to economize while continuing to provide a consistently
high quality of justice."'"M And finally, to act as an "honest broker" of ideas
relative to economy and efficiency. 33 As the GAO acknowledged, the
changes proposed by OPA represent not only a significant improvement but
also a significant change in the way oversight has been conducted in the
courts.36
Early in 1996, the AO published a report detailing its many efforts to
improve the efficiency of the court system, including reviews to help courts
make efficient and effective use of technology and the development of hand-
books, training manuals and other guides for use by the courts that identify
efficient practices, and investigations of allegations of fraud, waste, loss, or
is questionable. The AO estimated that Congress's decision in 1992 to federalize child sup-
port obligations would result in an estimated 500 additional cases per year; however, as of
1995, there had not been a single felony conviction for this offense. See Orrin G. Hatch, Con-
gress and the Courts: Establishing a Constructive Dialogue, 46 MERCER L. REV. 661, 666
(1995).
129. See Memorandum from Desiree L. Watkins to Arthur White (July 2, 1997) (on file
with the author).
130. See Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Enhancing the Relationship, 44
AM. U. L. REv. 1537, 1546 (1995).
131. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4(a)(2) (1994).
132. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4(a)(4) (1994).
133. See GAO REPORT ON COURT OVERSIGHT STANDARDS, supra note 89, at 11.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
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abuse. 3 The AO has also begun review of the work measurement methodol-
ogy used for court staffing purposes to determine how greater efficiencies
might be incorporated into the methodology.
38
The AO exhibits a growing recognition of the importance of program
reviews, economy, efficiency, and outreach. Coordinating these functions in
one office, while continuing to maintain an independent section for auditing,
as outlined in the Inspector General's Act, could be a useful tool for the AO.
It would serve not only in promoting these efforts, but also in providing a
visible response to the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse.
D. Prevention and Detection of Fraud and Abuse
The prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in the courts is highly
dependent on the information obtained from financial audits. However, fraud
and abuse are not limited to financial wrongdoings, and may include incom-
petent or inadequate employee performance, problems with alcohol or drug
abuse on the job, employees engaging in activities that fall outside of the de-
fined duties of their job, or even criminal activity by a court employee.
Complaints of employee misconduct'39 clearly fall under the category of pre-
vention and detection of fraud and abuse. However, at present, the AO has
no established procedure for handling complaints made by users of the
courts regarding the actions or conduct of an employee of the courts."4 An
inquiry to the AO Office of General Counsel confirmed that there are no
procedures for receiving or investigating complaints about court or AO em-
ployees."" It was suggested that an individual court, or the clerk of the court,
might have informal procedures for handling such complaints, but they
would not be uniform to all courts. Moreover, there are no regulations per-
taining to any investigation requirements and no central records kept of such
complaints. 42 Short of filing a lawsuit, a user of the court has no assistance,
or even guidance, on how to register a formal complaint against a court em-
ployee. 43 Nor does the user have any guarantee that a complaint will ever be
137. See id. at 23.
138. See id.
139. As used in this section, employee misconduct refers to misconduct by employees of
the courts other than judges. Complaints of judicial misconduct are handled according to 28
U.S.C. § 372 and are discussed infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text. Employee mis-
conduct would also include complaints against employees of the AO.
140. Telephone Interview with Susan Katan, Assistant General Counsel, Office of Gen-
eral Counsel, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (June 30, 1997). The AO does
have an Equal Employment Opportunity office that presumably would become involved in a
complaint raising issues of race, gender, or other illegal discrimination.
141. Complaints alleging financial misconduct would presumably be referred to the
Audit Department of the AO, although again, there is no regulation that requires this. See id.
142. See id.
143. Lawsuits filed against court employees, including judges, are handled by the AO
Office of General Counsel. See id.
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investigated. Similarly, there is no procedure for receiving and investigating
complaints made by a court employee about waste, fraud, or abuse, much
less any procedure to protect the identity of the employee.
Obviously, this system, or the lack thereof, needs review. The IG Act
specifically permits IGs to receive and investigate complaints made by em-
ployees and requires that the identity of the employee not be disclosed.'"
One of the initial tasks of an IG should be to establish uniform procedures to
be used in all federal courts for the filing of complaints against court em-
ployees, and investigation procedures that must be followed for each com-
plaint. This is an area where the creation of an IG in the AO would result in
the establishment of formal procedures and policies that would clearly
strengthen the oversight capacity of the federal courts over their own opera-
tions.
E. Communication of Problems and Deficiencies to Congress and the
Director
Congress currently learns about the activities of the AO from a statuto-
rily required annual report. The statute requires that the Director of the AO
submit to Congress a report45 "of the activities of the Administrative Office
and the state of the business of the courts... ."" This report must be accom-
panied by statistical data on the business of the courts.47 The statute does not
enumerate the data required, and nowhere is the Director specifically man-
dated to detail problems and deficiencies in the administration of the courts
or plans for corrective action, as required in the reports filed by an IG.'4
In additional to this annual report, the Director may from time to time
testify before Congress on issues of immediate concern, including budget
requests. 49 Individual judges, acting as representatives of the Judicial Con-
ference, also testify before Congress, frequently on pending legislation, the
passage of which would directly affect the federal courts.'
144. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 7(a), (b) (1994).
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(4) (1994).
146. Id. § 604(a)(3).
147. See id. § 604 (a)(2).
148. Although it could be argued that reporting on the "business of the courts" includes
reporting on problems and deficiencies, the statute is simply not that specific, and thus argua-
bly, problems need not be detailed. See id.
149. In November of 1995, AO Director Leonidas Ralph Mecham testified before the
Senate Environmental and Public Works' Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure
on the issue of courthouse construction. See Senate Committees Review Courthouse Con-
struction Program, THE THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1995 (visited Mar. 3, 1999)
<http:lwww.uscourts.gov/ttb/decttb/cowen.htm>. In April of 1996, Director Mecham testi-
fied before Congress on the Administrative Office's portion of the judiciary's budget request
for fiscal year 1997. See Judiciary Presents FY 97 Funding Request, THE THIRD BRANCH,
May 1996, at 1-3.
150. Chief Justice Henry A. Politz of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and Judge Ann
Claire Williams of the Northern District of Illinois testified before Congress on May 14, 1997,
19
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Clearly, in many cases, the creation of an IG would require only a reor-
ganization of departments that already perform aspects of the statutorily pre-
scribed IG duties. In other cases, the creation of an IG office offers the op-
portunity to create policies and procedures for addressing areas of oversight
that remain unexamined by the AO. While this will no doubt require that the
AO learn new skills, such efforts will not only strengthen the inspection and
oversight capacity of the AO, but will also assist the judiciary in its outreach
efforts to Congress and the public.
V. BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHING AN OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL IN THE
COURTS
Neither the AO nor the Judicial Conference supported Senator
McCain's bill.' Presumably this lack of support signifies, at best, a wariness
for the creation on an IG in the AO. However, this wariness is misplaced.
Although the establishment of an office of IG would require that Congress
be informed of problems and deficiencies in the administration of the judici-
ary as well as the progress of corrective actions, there is significant benefit to
the judiciary from the creation of such an office. Providing information to
Congress on problems in the administration of the judiciary in a predictable,
timely fashion may not only assure that such problems and deficiencies are
indeed handled properly, it may also serve to mitigate congressional inquir-
ies into the administrative workings of the judiciary."
A. Congressional Scrutiny
Senator McCain's bill is the latest in a series of events that signal Con-
gress' increasing concern with the administrative affairs of the federal judi-
regarding the impact H.R. 1252 could have on court operation, management and independ-
ence. H.R. 1252 is an amalgam of five suggested reforms to the federal courts, including al-
lowing parties on either side of a civil case to remove the assigned judge without stated cause
or reason, providing that any complaint of judicial misconduct be referred to a circuit outside
of the circuit where the complaint was made, and requiring the convening of a district court of
three judges to consider applications for injunctions restraining the enforcement of a state law
adopted by referendum on the grounds of unconstitutionality. See Leadership Speaks Out on
Judicial Issues, THE THIRD BRANCH, June 1997 (visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http://www.
uscourts.gov/ttb/june97ttblbalance.htm>. Judges also frequently testify before Congress on
the issue of creating new judgeships. In February of 1997, Chief Judge Julia Smith Gibbons
(W.D. Tenn.), among others, testified before a Senate Subcommittee on the allocation of
judgeships. See Judiciary Seeks to Balance Workload and Judgeship Needs, THE THIRD
BRANCH, Feb. 1997 (visited Mar. 3, 1999) <http:llwww.uscourts.gov/ttb/feb97ttb/ bal-
ance.htm>.
151. The AO had no official response to the bill. It is interesting to note, however, that in
November of 1995, the month before Senator McCain's bill was introduced, the AO adopted
new standards for conducting program assessments. The standards, with two exceptions, dis-
cussed supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text, tracked generally accepted government
auditing standards.
152. See infra notes 164 and accompanying text.
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ciary. In 1990, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act (CIRA), re-
quiring each district court to develop an "expense and delay reduction plan"
to address the reasons for delay in the district and recommend cost cutting
measures. " The Civil Justice Reform Act specifically requires that a report
be prepared and made available to the public that lists, for each judge in the
district, the number of motions that have been pending for more than six
months, the number of bench trials that have been waiting to go to trial for
more than six months, and the number of cases that have not been terminated
within three years of filing. "' The passage of this legislation marked the first
time in the history of the judiciary that judges were required to provide these
figures to the public. In some instances, the revelations have been startling.
A federal district court judge in New York was found to have 55 cases that
had been pending more than three years, and one case in which the parties
had been waiting 11 years for a decision. 5
Many in the judiciary share a concern that the independence of the judi-
cial branch is eroded by such legislative and executive intervention in the
operation of the judicial branch.'56 However, Congress has continued to act.
As recently as 1996, Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman of the Senate Judi-
ciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, sent a sur-
vey to all active and senior court of appeals and district court judges asking a
series of questions dealing with judicial administration and workload, circuit
conferences, and outside work activities. The survey was conducted "in an
attempt to directly communicate with, and elicit input from, the judiciary in
order to better understand the needs of the federal judiciary, as well as to
find cost efficiencies with the judicial system."'" Although some judges
153. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994). Almost unanimously, federal judges attacked this
legislation, claiming that it "interferes with both the integrity and the independence of our...
courts ... it is bad policy ... it will increase costs and delays rather than reduce [them] ....
The tendency for the Legislative Branch to micro-manage the Judicial Branch should be re-
sisted by those who truly see the value of an independent judiciary." Federal Courts Study
Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.,2d Sess. 431-433 (1990) (statement of Judge G. Thomas
Eisele, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas).
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 476 (1994).
155. See Doreen Carvajal, New York's Clogged U.S. Courts Delaying Civil Verdicts for
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at Al. The case is identified in the article as Brown v.
Trion. A Westlaw search revealed an opinion from Judge Glasser in 1983 granting defen-
dant's motion for summary judgement. See Brown v. Trion Indus., 223 U.S.P.Q. 1106 (1983).
No further opinions in this case were found.
156. The entire issue of 46 MERCER L. REV. (1995) is devoted to the subject of judicial
independence. See Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the Rules Enabling Act, 46
MERCER L. REV. 733 (1995); Deanell Reece Tacha, Independence of the Judiciary for the
Third Century, 46 MERCER L. REV. 645 (1995). But see Edwin Meese III, Reining in the Fed-
eral Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE 178 (1997).
157. U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AND THE
COURTS, REPORT ON THE JAN. 1996 JUDICIAL SURVEY (PART 1, U.S. COURTS OF APPEAL)
(1996).
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were supportive of the survey, many resounded continuing concerns that this
was an interference with the independence of the judiciary and an attempt to
"micro-manage" the judiciary. ' In publishing a report on the survey, Sena-
tor Grassley noted that "the results of the survey ... revealed several areas
of interest that the Subcommittee intends to pursue through legislative ini-
tiative and/or Congressional inquiry."'59 Among the recurrent themes that
Senator Grassley identified in the survey responses was the promotion of
further cost savings within the judiciary."6 Methods to be explored to ac-
complish these savings include courtroom sharing, reviewing staffing needs,
and increased use of case management practices and programs. 6'
Other actions discussed by Congress are considerably more alarming,
including calls for the abolishment of life tenure," the election of federal
judges, and giving Congress the power to override court decisions.
The creation of an IG office could aid the courts in addressing Con-
gress' increasing concerns. Currently, whenever Congress has a question
about an operation within the judiciary, it orders an investigation by the
General Accounting Office (GAO). Since 1993, in addition to the GAO re-
port on oversight standards, Congress has ordered the GAO to investigate
courthouse construction and the process used by the federal judiciary to es-
timate its space needs, the Judicial Survivors Annuities System, the Judiciary
Automation Fund, judicial security, and the National Fine Center (a project
to centralize criminal debt collection and accounting in the federal judici-
ary), as well as to provide a detailed report of appropriations, expenditures,
and functions of the AO."6 These investigations are often extremely frus-
158. See id. at 1. Two comments expressing concern were included in the report, identi-
fied only by the judge's circuit. A judge from the Eighth Circuit stated: "The courts are best
able to establish their own internal procedures, just as the House and Senate are best able to
determine the rules and practices that each body will follow. I would hope that extreme care
and caution be exercised and that there not be efforts to micro-manage what has been so care-
fully and conscientiously developed by the courts over a considerable period of time." Id. A
judge from the Ninth Circuit was more blunt: "Issues like the over-use of law clerks and pub-
lishing practices should not be subject to legislative oversight or corrective legislation because
they are 'judicial problems'." Id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. On April 23, 1997, New Hampshire Senator Bob Smith introduced legislation lim-
iting the terms of federal judges to ten years. See Smith Introduces Bill Calling for Tenn Lim-
its for Judges (Press Release, Apr. 23, 1997) available in 1997 WL 4431941, at *1.
163. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 117 (1996).
164. See FEDERAL JUDICIARY SPACE: LONG RANGE PLANNING PROCESS NEEDS REVISION
(Testimony, Oct. 7, 1993, GAO/T-GGD-94-18); see also FEDERAL PENSIONS: JUDICIAL
SURVIVORS' ANNUrrIES SYSTEM COSTS AND BENEFIT LEVELS (Letter Report, June 26, 1987,
GAO/GGD-97-87); JUDICIARY AUTOMATION FUND: REAUTHORIZATION SHOULD BE LINKED TO
BETrER PLANNING AND REPORTING (Testimony, June 30, 1994, GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-94-176);
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SECURITY: COMPREHENSIVE RISK-BASED PROGRAM SHOULD BE FULLY
IMPLEMENTED (Chapter Report, July 14, 1994, GAO/GGD-94-112); NATIONAL FINE CENTER:
PROGRESS MADE BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN FOR CRIMINAL DEBT SYSTEM (Letter Report, May
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trating for the judiciary because the AO views the GAO's approach to the
judiciary as lacking an understanding of the many structural and administra-
tive characteristics that make the judiciary a unique organization, unlike any
agency that the GAO works with in the executive branch. The creation of an
IG within the courts would allow the courts, either working alone, or in
conjunction with the GAO, to bring knowledge of the unique administrative
and structural design of the judiciary to these investigations. Undoubtedly,
this would assist Congress in obtaining a more accurate response to its con-
cern as to how the judiciary is functioning. An IG, working within the court
system and having specialized knowledge of the courts, would also assist in
making recommendations for action most appropriate to the structural and
administrative characteristics of the courts.
B. Public Distrust
Congress' actions have been fueled, at least in part, by public sentiment.
Public confidence in the judiciary is low and continues to decline.'65 Delay,
expense,'" highly publicized trials with seemingly unjust outcomes, and
publicity about lavish spending on new federal courthouses'" have rein-
forced the public's suspicion and raised concerns about judicial accountabil-
ity.
The appointment of an IG in the judiciary, properly publicized, could be
an important step toward stemming growing public distrust of judicial ac-
countability. Because an IG is required to file reports with Congress on a
regular basis which are available to the public,' 5 the courts would thus pro-
vide the public with an increased ability to monitor and understand the
workings of the judiciary. The judiciary has attempted to communicate its
efforts at efficiency and increased accountability to the public with seem-
ingly little success. As a central point for information and data, an IG's of-
fice could help make the judiciary's public outreach efforts more visible.'69
25, 1995, GAO/AIMD-95-76); THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: OBSERVATIONS OF SELECTED ISSUES
(Briefing Report, Sept. 18, 1995, GAO/GGD-95-236BR).
165. See Frances Kahn Zemans, From Chambers to Community, 80 JUDICATURE 62, 63
(1996).
166. Delay and expense were two of the most common complaints leading to the enact-
ment of the Civil Justice Reform Act. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS xiii (1996).
167. See Kathleen Kerr, Foley Square: Opulence in the Courts, NEwSDAY, May 1, 1994,
at A6; see also Bob Hohler, Senate Panel Raps Breyer Over Fan Pier, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 15, 1994, at 1.
168. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(c) (1994).
169. Courts are trying to improve communication with the communities they serve and
heighten public awareness of how the courts function, including the initiation of cost saving
measures. See Edited Transcript of Panel Discussion, Court-Community Collaboration: New
Partnerships for Court Improvement, 80 JUDICATURE 213 (1997); see also Gary S. Brown,
Court Monitoring: A Say for Citizens in their Justice System, 80 JUDICATUrRE 219 (1997).
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C. Efficient Administrative Practices
An IG office in the AO could also serve as a clearinghouse for informa-
tion about up-to-date, appropriate management techniques. An IG could be-
come a key player in the court's management efforts. With a clear under-
standing that the role of the IG is not only to identify waste, fraud, and
abuse, but, more importantly, to assist the courts in preventing these ills, an
IG's office could provide leadership in efficient administration. By focusing
on programs to uncover and correct inefficiencies, and promote modem
methods of management, the IG would be a central source to which judges
could turn for guidance in effective administrative practices, as well as as-
sistance in handling any actual waste, fraud, or abuse by court employees.
VI. CREATING AN OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS
A. Senator McCain's Bill
Currently, the IG Act specifically excludes the AO from its purview.'
Seeking to "enhance the cost-effective use of the taxpayer resources utilized
to administer our Federal courts," Senator McCain's proposed bill sought to
create the position of IG in the AO.' The legislation called for a presiden-
tially-appointed IG, modifying the usual method of appointment only
slightly.' The bill specified that the Judicial Conference of the United States
submit a list of individuals for nomination as IG of the AO to the President.
The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, then selects an in-
dividual from this list to serve as IG. The IG would report to and be under
the general supervision of the Director of the AO, but like all other presi-
dentially-appointed IGs, could be removed from office only by the Presi-
dent.""
Senator McCain's bill imposes the same duties on the IG of the AO as
all other IGs: perform audits; review legislation; promote economy, effi-
ciency, and effectiveness; liaison with other agencies; prevent and detect
fraud and abuse; and inform Congress and the agency head about problems
and corrective action. The bill specifically requires the transfer of the AO's
"Office of Audit," ' which conducts routine cyclical financial reviews of the
170. The section of the Act requiring the creation of nonpresidentially-appointed IGs
specifies that it does not cover any entity in either the judicial or the legislative branches. See
5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 8G(a)(1)(F) (1994). The judiciary is not named in the section of the Act re-
quiring Presidentially appointed IGs. See id. § 3.
171. See 141 CONG. REc. S18016-03 (Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Senator McCain).
172. See S. 1446, 104th Cong. § 2.
173. See id. § 2(a)(2).
174. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3(a) (1994).
175. See S. 1446, 104th Cong. § 2(b).
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courts and oversees the work of contract financial auditors, to the newly cre-
ated "Office of Inspector General." As discussed earlier, because the AO
currently handles some of the other duties the bill requires of IGs, other of-
fices would undoubtedly be transferred to the Office of the IG as well.
176
B. Required Amendments of McCain's Legislation
1. The Appointment Process
The legislation introduced by Senator McCain must be amended signifi-
cantly in order to be successful. His bill, as introduced, contains two serious
flaws. The bill's most glaring error lies in the appointment process outlined
for the IG of the AO. The bill directs that the IG is to be chosen by the
President from a list of individuals submitted by the Judicial Conference of
the United States.' By requiring the IG in the AO to be a presidential ap-
pointee, Senator McCain's bill infringes on the separation of powers doc-
trine. Because the judiciary is an independent branch of government, the ap-
pointment process for an IG should parallel, not copy, that of the Executive
branch. The Chief Justice, the leader of the judiciary, should appoint the IG
for the courts, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Chief Justice
alone should have the power to remove the IG, communicating the reasons
for removal to the Senate. The IG should report to the head of the AO, and
have the same powers to conduct investigations as presidentially-appointed
IGs and the same reporting requirements to Congress as all other federal
IGs. This structure preserves administrative independence within the judici-
ary, while it directly provides Congress with information about concerns re-
garding the judiciary.
2. The Investigative Authority of the Inspector General
A second significant flaw in Senator McCain's bill lies in its unfettered
grant of investigative power over judges to IGs."' The investigative jurisdic-
tion of the IG into allegations of judicial misconduct should be limited. Spe-
cifically, an IG should become involved in investigations of judicial miscon-
duct only at the invitation of either the chief judge of the circuit, or any other
judicial body involved in the discipline procedure. Furthermore, an IG
should have no authority to review, or even comment on, the substance of
court decisions. Without these limitations, the creation of an office of IG
with the authority to investigate a particular judge on a complaint of judicial
misconduct, or review the content of judicial opinions, threatens the concept
of judicial independence that is the cornerstone of our democracy and the
176. See supra Part IV.
177. See S. 1446, 104th Cong. §2(a)(2).
178. Senator McCain's bill does not address an IG's investigative authority in any man-
ner. See id.
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foundation of a fair, impartial judiciary.
With the passage of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 in
Title 28 of the United States Code (hereinafter "Judicial Misconduct Act"),
Congress gave the federal judiciary the task of devising its own self-
disciplinary framework. 8 That framework includes the right of any person
alleging that a judge has engaged in judicial misconduct to file a complaint
with the clerk of the court of appeals for that circuit.' On the basis of in-
formation available, the chief judge may also, by written order providing
reasons, identify a complaint, dispensing with the need to file a written com-
plaint.' The chief judge of the circuit is charged with handling the com-
plaint, which under current law may include disposing of it as frivolous' or
appointing a special committee of judges to investigate the allegations" and
file a written report with the judicial council of the circuit of the committee's
findings and recommendations for action."
A third choice should be added that allows the chief judge, or any other
judicial body involved in the investigatory process, to request that the IG
conduct an investigation of the allegations and file a written report with the
judicial council of the circuit stating the IG's findings and recommendations
for action. The chief judge, or any of the other judicial bodies involved,
would thus have the option to call upon the investigative skills of the IG in
matters deemed appropriate for investigation by someone other than a fellow
judge. For instance, allegations that involve personnel issues or administra-
tive irregularities are best investigated by an IG, while issues related to judi-
cial decisionmaking or courtroom demeanor are probably best left to fellow
judges.
The Judicial Misconduct Act further provides that after the filing of a
written report, the judicial council may take a number of steps, including
certifying a judge as disabled, requesting voluntary retirement, ordering that
no further cases be assigned to the judge for a certain amount of time, and
privately or publicly censuring a judge.'86 Alternatively, the judicial council
may refer any complaint to the Judicial Conference of the United States.'
The Conference may conduct further investigation, take further action, and
may transmit the record to the House of Representatives.'88 The House may
take whatever action it considers to be necessary, including impeachment
179. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1994).
180. See Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 989,
993 (1996).
181. See 28 U.S.C. §372 (c)(1) (1994).
182. See id.
183. See id. § 372(c)(3)(A).
184. See id. § 372 (c)(4)(A).
185. See id. § 372 (c)(5).
186. See id. § 372 (c)(6).
187. See id. §§ 372(c)(7)(A), (c)(7)(B).
188. See id. § 372 (c)(8)(A).
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proceedings.' 9 Significantly, the Judicial Misconduct Act does not allow the
Judicial Council or the Judicial Conference to remove a judge from office.
Removal of a federal judge may be accomplished only through impeach-
ment.'19 However, given the Constitutional salary and tenure protections af-
forded federal judges, peer pressure is perhaps the most effective method of
handling incidents of misconduct among federal judges. Complaints about
the conduct of federal judges that come to the attention of the IG of the AO
should be referred initially to the chief judge of the circuit.
Exempting judicial misconduct from the purview of an IG for the AO,
except at the invitation of a chief judge or other judicial body involved in the
disciplinary process, does not mean that judges would not be affected by the
creation of such a position. With jurisdiction over all non-judicial employ-
ees, an IG may be involved in investigating actions taken by court employ-
ees within chambers as well as promoting effective practices within admin-
istrative work done in chambers. Furthermore, a judge would be free to call
upon the IG to assist his court in preventing, or uncovering and correcting,
inefficiencies, waste, fraud, or abuse. In this sense, an IG would be a valu-
able resource for a federal judge eager to employ the most effective man-
agement practices.
VII. CONCLUSION
IGs serve as independent internal watchdogs charged with safeguarding,
and at times repairing, their agencies' integrity. The Long Range Plan for the
Federal Courts, issued by the Judicial Conference two years ago, calls for the
federal court system to "ensure its own accountability through the example
of its leadership, self-imposed standards of conduct that are more stringent
than those for other public officials, [and] a demonstrated ability to make ef-
ficient use of the resources it has been given. . . .""' By working with Con-
gress in the creation of an Office of Inspector General for the federal courts,
rather than risking having such an office forced upon it, the judiciary may
ensure that the position is responsive to, and respectful of, the mission of the
judiciary. An amended bill, providing for appointment by the Chief Justice
and limits on the investigative authority of the IG, could provide for the
creation of an IG in the AO to stem the increasing scrutiny and suspicion of
Congress. By discouraging even more dire attempts by Congress to control
the federal courts, creation of such an office may in fact be an important step
in the effort to protect judicial independence. Furthermore, the creation of
such an office would demonstrate the strength of the judiciary's commitment
to the goals of accountability and the efficient and effective delivery of jus-
tice.
189. See id.
190. See Breyer, supra note 180, at 993.
191. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNIrED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COuRTS 9 (1995).
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